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Case Note 
EXPLORING A NEW FRONTIER IN SINGAPORE’S  
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
IM Skaugen SE v MAN Diesel & Turbo SE 
[2016] SGHCR 6 
The establishment of the Singapore International Commercial 
Court (“SICC”) marks a significant development in 
Singapore’s private international law. This note leverages on 
the Singapore High Court decision of IM Skaugen SE v MAN 
Diesel & Turbo SE [2016] SGHCR 6 to discuss two key issues 
raised by the SICC: the relationship between the Singapore 
High Court’s and the SICC’s jurisdictional rules, and the 
applicable test for the exercise of the SICC’s jurisdiction. This 
note argues that the possibility of a transfer to the SICC 
should influence the High Court’s exercise of its international 
jurisdiction, and that the SICC should not apply the common 
law jurisdictional approaches for the exercise of its 
international jurisdiction, but a unique test that recognises 
the competing policy objectives it has to balance. 
CHNG Wei Yao Kenny 
LLB (Singapore Management University) (Summa Cum Laude). 
I. Introduction 
1 The Singapore International Commercial Court (“SICC”) was 
officially established as a division of the Singapore High Court1 on 
5 January 2015.2 This heralded the accomplishment of an important 
lynchpin in Singapore’s strategy to expand its legal services sector, 
profile Singapore law as the law of choice for international commercial 
disputes and cement Singapore as a leading destination for commercial 
dispute resolution.3 Cases which are “international and commercial in 
                                                          
1 Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) s 18A. 
2 “Establishment of the SICC” <http://www.sicc.gov.sg/About.aspx?id=21> (accessed 
May 2016). 
3 Report of the Singapore International Commercial Court Committee (29 November 
2013) at paras 1, 5 and 6. The Singapore International Commercial Court 
complements the work of the Singapore International Arbitration Centre and the 
Singapore International Mediation Centre to achieve these goals. 
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nature” fall within the jurisdiction of the SICC,4 and cases may be 
transferred from the High Court to the SICC and vice versa under 
conditions specified in the Rules of Court.5 To facilitate its objective of 
drawing international commercial cases to Singapore, several of the 
SICC’s unique features are as follows: (a) the SICC is not bound to apply 
Singapore rules of evidence;6 (b) it may allow questions of foreign law to 
be determined on submissions rather than proof;7 (c) registered foreign 
lawyers can argue before the SICC;8 and (d) the SICC bench comprises 
distinguished jurists from major jurisdictions around the world.9 
2 Aside from representing a major step toward the fulfilment of 
Singapore’s ambitions to be an internationally recognised dispute 
resolution hub, the advent of the SICC also marks a significant 
milestone in Singapore’s private international law. It introduces a new 
body of jurisdictional rules into Singapore law and, as with any 
burgeoning area of law, several teething issues as to how the SICC rules 
should be interpreted and how these will interact with the existing rules 
remain to be elaborated. In view of the nascent stage of development 
of this area of law, the recent Singapore High Court decision of 
IM Skaugen SE v MAN Diesel & Turbo SE10 (“IM Skaugen”) is a 
frontrunner in the development of the law in this regard. In this case, 
the assistant registrar presiding over the case ably faced several of these 
issues head-on and proposed solutions to guide the law’s development. 
3 This note aims to use the judgment in IM Skaugen as a 
launching point to discuss and analyse two key issues in Singapore’s 
private international law raised by the establishment of the SICC: the 
relationship between the High Court’s and the SICC’s jurisdictional 
rules, and the applicable test for the exercise of the SICC’s jurisdiction. 
This note argues that the possibility of a transfer to the SICC should 
influence the Singapore High Court’s application of the Spiliada 
Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd11 (“Spiliada”) calculus, although the High 
Court should continue to apply its own rules of international 
jurisdiction and not those of the SICC. This note also seeks to 
demonstrate that the common law approaches, that is, the English 
                                                          
4 Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) s 18D. The definitions of 
“international” and “commercial” for the purpose of this section can be found in 
O 110 rr 1(2)(a) and 1(2)(b) of the Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) 
respectively. 
5 Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed. Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) 
s 18F; Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) O 110 r 12. 
6 Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) s 18K. 
7 Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) s 18L. 
8 Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) s 18M. 
9 “Judges” <http://www.sicc.gov.sg/Judges.aspx?id=30> (accessed May 2016). 
10 [2016] SGHCR 6. 
11 [1987] 1 AC 460. 
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Spiliada and the Australian Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd12 
(“Voth”) tests, should not be adopted as the tests for the exercise of the 
SICC’s jurisdiction pursuant to O 110 r 8 of the Singapore Rules of 
Court. Instead, the exercise of the SICC’s international jurisdiction 
should be governed by a unique test that leans strongly towards the 
exercise of jurisdiction but has the flexibility to decline to exercise 
jurisdiction in exceptional circumstances in order to take into account 
the competing policy considerations it has to balance. As for the test 
governing a transfer of proceedings from the High Court to the SICC 
pursuant to O 110 r 12(4), above the requirement that the case in 
question be in substance international and commercial in nature, the 
court should balance the benefits of a transfer against the inconvenience 
and possible expense it may cause to the litigants. For avoidance of 
doubt, any reference to the High Court in this note refers to the High 
Court excluding the SICC. 
II. IM Skaugen 
4 In IM Skaugen, the plaintiffs were a group of companies 
providing marine transportation services in the oil and gas industry, 
with constituents incorporated in Norway and Singapore. The defendants 
were manufacturers of marine diesel engines, with constituents 
incorporated in Germany and Norway. The plaintiffs contracted with 
Chinese shipbuilders to build ships and opted to purchase ship engines 
from the defendants. During the course of negotiations between the 
plaintiffs and the defendants, the defendants made representations in a 
project planning manual regarding the rate of fuel consumption of the 
engines. Representations as to the rate of fuel consumption were also 
made in a technical agreement between the Chinese shipyard and the 
defendant. The shipbuilders purchased the engines from the defendants 
pursuant to this technical agreement. When the completed engines were 
put through factory acceptance tests, the results of the tests purported to 
show that the rates of fuel consumption were below the values 
previously represented to the plaintiffs. The defendants conceded that 
the factory acceptance tests may have been externally influenced in an 
improper manner to display incorrect rates of fuel consumption. 
5 At the time of the Singapore High Court’s judgment, the 
two sides were engaged in arbitration in Denmark and the International 
Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”), as well as litigation in Norway. Before 
the High Court, the plaintiffs pleaded that the representations made to 
them by the defendants during negotiations and the factory acceptance 
tests regarding the fuel consumption rates of their engines were false, 
                                                          
12 (1990) 171 CLR 538. 
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and that the plaintiffs were induced to rely upon, and did rely upon, 
these representations. The plaintiffs also alleged negligence and fraud. 
The defendants applied to set aside service of the writ out of jurisdiction 
and, alternatively, for a stay of proceedings on the ground that Singapore 
is not the natural forum. In the further alternative, the defendants 
argued that the proceedings should be stayed on case management 
grounds pending the outcome of other proceedings. In response, the 
plaintiffs argued, inter alia, that Singapore was the natural forum for the 
dispute and that the establishment of the SICC should feature in the 
natural forum calculus. 
6 The assistant registrar eventually held for the defendants as 
Germany was found to be a more appropriate forum than Singapore. 
Accordingly, the writ for service out of jurisdiction was set aside. 
III. Relationship between the High Court’s and SICC’s 
jurisdictional rules 
7 In coming to his decision, the assistant registrar addressed the 
issue of whether the existing common law principles on the exercise of 
jurisdiction, as applied in the High Court, should be influenced by the 
possibility of transferring the case to the SICC. 
8 The common law approach to the exercise of jurisdiction is well 
established and has been reaffirmed by the Court of Appeal on several 
occasions.13 Essentially, the position in Singapore is aligned with the 
seminal English decision in Spiliada, where the House of Lords held that 
the overarching inquiry in determining whether the court should 
exercise its jurisdiction or grant a stay of proceedings involves a search 
for the most appropriate forum where “the case may be tried more 
suitably for the interests of all parties and the ends of justice”.14 The 
Court of Appeal, in reaffirming the applicable test in Singapore, 
emphasised that “it is important to see what the case is about, and 
connections which have no or little bearing on adjudication of the issues 
in dispute between the parties will carry little weight”.15 
                                                          
13 Zoom Communications Ltd v Broadcast Solutions Ltd [2014] 4 SLR 500; JIO Minerals 
FZC v Mineral Enterprises [2011] 1 SLR 391 at [38]–[44]; Rickshaw Investments 
Ltd v Nicolai Baron von Uexkull [2007] 1 SLR(R) 377; Brinkerhoff Maritime 
Drilling Corp v PT Airfast Services Indonesia [1992] 2 SLR(R) 345. 
14 Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1987] 1 AC 460 at 476C. 
15 JIO Minerals FZC v Mineral Enterprises [2011] 1 SLR 391 at [41]; Halsbury’s Laws 
of Singapore (LexisNexis, 2013) at para 75.090. 
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9 As set out in Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore16 and affirmed by the 
Court of Appeal,17 factors which the court will consider at the first stage 
of the Spiliada analysis include personal connections, connections to 
events and transactions, governing law, other proceedings and shape of 
the litigation. Should the defendant seeking a stay of proceedings 
succeed in proving that a foreign court is the more appropriate forum at 
this stage, the court will ordinarily grant a stay of proceedings, unless 
the plaintiff succeeds in showing that the case should nevertheless be 
heard in the forum due to the interests of justice. At this second stage of 
the Spiliada inquiry, factors that the court will consider include whether 
the foreign court will give effect to parties’ choice of law, the presence of 
a time bar and whether there will be a denial of substantial justice if the 
case is stayed.18 
10 Broadly, the same approach applies for cases of service out of 
jurisdiction, except that the procedural context is reversed. Where the 
plaintiff is seeking leave for service out of jurisdiction, the burden is on 
the plaintiff to prove that the forum is the most appropriate forum. 
Should the plaintiff fail to do so, he could argue that the interests of 
justice demand that the forum hear the case nonetheless. The defendant 
may apply to set aside service of the writ out of jurisdiction or to apply 
for a stay of proceedings, although in view of the differing allocation of 
the burden of proof, the more strategic option for the defendant would 
probably be the former.19 
11 The introduction of the SICC as a specialist court within the 
Singapore judicial system raises the question of whether the possibility 
of a transfer to the SICC should influence the Spiliada test as it is applied 
in the High Court. On this issue, the assistant registrar held in the 
affirmative. He held that the existence of the SICC has a direct effect on 
the factors to be considered in the Spiliada test. For instance, the ability 
of foreign counsel to directly submit on foreign law in the SICC could 
have a bearing on the degree of inconvenience a party would experience 
in arguing points of foreign law.20 
                                                          
16 Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore (LexisNexis, 2013) at paras 75.090–75.095. 
17 JIO Minerals FZC v Mineral Enterprises [2011] 1 SLR 391 at [42]. See also Rickshaw 
Investments Ltd v Nicolai Baron von Uexkull [2007] 1 SLR(R) 377 at [15] and Good 
Earth Agricultural Co Ltd v Novus International Pte Ltd [2008] 2 SLR(R) 711 
at [10]. 
18 Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore (LexisNexis, 2013) at paras 75.096–75.100; JIO Minerals 
FZC v Mineral Enterprises [2011] 1 SLR 391 at [44]. 
19 The defendant can make both arguments in the alternative without being 
construed as having submitted to the jurisdiction of the forum. See Zoom 
Communications Ltd v Broadcast Solutions Ltd [2014] 4 SLR 500 at [32]–[33]. 
20 IM Skaugen SE v MAN Diesel & Turbo SE [2016] SGHCR 6 at [24]. 
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12 The assistant registrar also opined that the High Court should 
take the SICC into account in the Spiliada test only if the case would 
subsequently be transferred to the SICC:21 
… lest the court take into account considerations that it ought not to 
have taken into account were it to transpire that proceedings would 
not or ought not to be transferred to the SICC. 
To that end, he weighed against a cleanly demarcated approach under 
which the High Court would first decide whether it had international 
jurisdiction on its own private international law rules before considering 
whether the case could be transferred to the SICC as a matter of internal 
allocation of jurisdiction. In this vein, the assistant registrar suggested 
that it would be artificial to exclude the SICC from the Spiliada calculus 
as “technical intricacies should not determine the substantive content of 
the law where this would be contrary to common reason”.22 
13 It is suggested that the assistant registrar’s conclusion is sound; 
the possibility of transfer to the SICC should rightly influence the 
application of the Spiliada test. The next section23 details additional 
justifications for this conclusion. However, it is suggested that a 
conceptual separation between the questions of international jurisdiction 
and internal allocation of jurisdiction should be maintained for clarity 
and soundness in principle. This argument will be further elaborated in 
the following section. 
A. Should the SICC be a factor in the Spiliada calculus? 
14 There are several arguments that can be made for the possibility 
of a transfer to the SICC to influence the High Court’s application of the 
Spiliada calculus to determine whether it (the High Court) should 
exercise its international jurisdiction to hear the merits of the matter. 
15 First, as the assistant registrar pointed out, the factors 
considered in the Spiliada test will be affected by the existence of the 
SICC. As mentioned earlier, at the first stage of the Spiliada analysis, 
these factors include the governing law, other proceedings and the shape 
of the litigation. Should the SICC be included as part of this calculus, 
the SICC’s international bench and ability to decide on foreign law 
based on submissions could erase any advantage the foreign forum may 
have for the application of foreign law in the natural forum analysis. 
Further, the existence of the SICC as a one-stop forum where foreign 
counsel can argue several different issues with different applicable 
                                                          
21 IM Skaugen SE v MAN Diesel & Turbo SE [2016] SGHCR 6 at [30]. 
22 IM Skaugen SE v MAN Diesel & Turbo SE [2016] SGHCR 6 at [30]. 
23 See paras 14–17 below. 
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foreign laws with considerably greater convenience and ease than in a 
conventional domestic court may also lean towards allowing the suit to 
proceed in Singapore in order to prevent fragmentation of litigation 
over numerous jurisdictions. Thus, to intentionally exclude the SICC 
from this calculus would affect the application of the Spiliada test in a 
manner that does not accurately reflect the characteristics of the legal 
system in Singapore. 
16 Second, taking the SICC into account in the Spiliada test is 
consistent with the overarching policy intention driving the 
establishment of the SICC. The SICC is envisioned to become “the 
premium forum for court-based commercial dispute resolution both 
within and beyond Asia”,24 which will serve to enhance Singapore’s status 
as “a leading forum for legal services and commercial dispute 
resolution”.25 The SICC is intended to “create a platform to catalyse the 
further growth of the legal services sector and the internationalisation of 
Singapore law”.26 Consequently, for the SICC to fulfil these policy 
objectives, the law should maximise the number of appropriate cases 
over which the SICC can assume jurisdiction, within reason. This policy 
consideration has been enshrined in statutory law. In the Choice of 
Court Agreements Act,27 which is the enactment of the Hague 
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements 200528 in Singapore law, 
a contractual choice of the High Court is deemed to be a choice of the 
SICC as well, unless expressly provided for otherwise29 – a move which 
would broaden the number of cases over which the SICC can exercise 
jurisdiction. The common law should also do its part to facilitate this 
policy objective. Taking into account the possibility of transfer to the 
SICC in the Spiliada test will serve this end as cases that may otherwise 
be heard in foreign forums could be transferred to the SICC instead, 
maximising the reach of the SICC. 
17 Finally, the High Court has demonstrated an inclination 
towards taking into account the possibility of a transfer to the SICC in 
the Spiliada test. In Accent Delight International Ltd v Bouvier, Yves 
Charles Edgar30 (“Accent Delight”), the High Court invited submissions 
from the parties as to the suitability of transferring the case to the SICC. 
                                                          
24 Report of the Singapore International Commercial Court Committee (29 November 
2013) at para 10. 
25 Report of the Singapore International Commercial Court Committee (29 November 
2013) at para 55. 
26 Report of the Singapore International Commercial Court Committee (29 November 
2013) at para 55. 
27 Act 14 of 2016. 
28 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (30 June 2005). 
29 Choice of Court Agreements Act 2016 (Act 14 of 2016) s 2(2). 
30 [2016] 2 SLR 841. 
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The defendants argued, inter alia, that the possibility of transfer to the 
SICC should not feature in the Spiliada analysis. Although the judge did 
not specifically address this argument, she ultimately opined that the 
suit was eminently suitable for a transfer to the SICC in view of the 
strong international dimension of the case.31 As the case before the judge 
was predominantly a question of whether the court should exercise  
its jurisdiction, thus invoking the Spiliada test, the High Court’s 
consideration of the SICC at this stage evinces a preliminary willingness 
to take the SICC into account in the Spiliada test. Although this 
willingness in itself does not indicate that taking the SICC into account 
in the Spiliada test is the correct approach, it does serve as a signal that 
the courts are welcoming of this approach. 
B. Should there be conceptual separation between international 
jurisdiction and internal allocation of jurisdiction? 
18 As mentioned above, the assistant registrar was of the view that 
there should not be a strict separation between the questions of 
international jurisdiction and internal allocation of jurisdiction in the 
context of the SICC32 in order to ensure that the High Court does not 
unduly take the SICC into account when the case is not suitable for 
transfer anyway. Notably, near the end of his judgment, the assistant 
registrar suggested that if the conditions are met for a transfer of a case 
from the High Court to the SICC, the High Court should apply the 
SICC’s private international law rules (that is, the “not appropriate” 
test)33 instead of its own private international law rules (that is, the 
Spiliada test) to determine whether the High Court itself has 
international jurisdiction.34 
19 With respect, the suggestion that the SICC’s private 
international law rules would apply in such a situation is conceptually 
problematic. There are two distinct jurisdictional issues in play here. 
The first is whether the High Court has the international jurisdiction to 
hear the case. The second is whether the High Court should transfer the 
proceedings to the SICC, which is a matter of internal allocation of 
jurisdiction. As argued above, it is suggested that the possibility of a 
transfer to the SICC should indeed influence the answer to the first 
question as a consideration under the Spiliada test. However, the 
assistant registrar’s suggestion takes the effect of the SICC on the High 
Court’s international jurisdiction one step too far by placing the 
                                                          
31 Accent Delight International Ltd v Bouvier, Yves Charles Edgar [2016] 2 SLR 841 
at [116]. 
32 IM Skaugen SE v MAN Diesel & Turbo SE [2016] SGHCR 6 at [27]–[30]. 
33 Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) O 110 r 8. 
34 IM Skaugen SE v MAN Diesel & Turbo SE [2016] SGHCR 6 at [145]. 
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question of internal allocation of jurisdiction prior to the question of 
whether the High Court should exercise international jurisdiction to 
hear the case in the first place. This cannot be right in principle. As 
Yeo Tiong Min SC pointed out in his Eighth Yong Pung How 
Professorship of Law Lecture:35 
Logically, the question of international jurisdiction precedes the issue 
of internal allocation of jurisdiction. The balance of principle, policy, 
and international comity that underlies the common law test of strong 
cause to uphold bargains and the interests of the parties and the ends 
of justice in the Spiliada test continues to be relevant at this stage. In 
other words, transfer to the SICC should not engage SICC’s rules of 
international jurisdiction. 
It is suggested that a conceptual distinction between international 
jurisdiction and internal allocation of jurisdiction can be maintained, 
while also ensuring that the High Court does not unduly take the SICC 
into account for cases which are eventually determined to be not 
amenable for transfer. A preferable legal framework would be for the 
High Court to continue applying its own private international law rules, 
that is, the Spiliada test. As part of the Spiliada analysis, the High Court 
should have regard to the SICC’s private international law rules to 
determine whether the case is appropriate for transfer to the SICC. If it 
is, and if a holistic analysis of the Spiliada factors points towards 
Singapore as the natural forum, the High Court will first exercise 
jurisdiction over the case and then, if appropriate, subsequently order it 
to be transferred to the SICC. Crucially, this suggested framework of 
analysis remains situated within the domain of the High Court’s own 
private international law rules. Thus, conceptually, the question of 
international jurisdiction remains prior to the question of internal 
allocation of jurisdiction, although in practical effect, the High Court 
will take into account the answer to the second question in its 
consideration of the first. Notwithstanding the similarities in practical 
consequence between the assistant registrar’s suggestion and the 
framework described here, it is suggested that this framework is more 
conceptually sound and coheres better with fundamental principles of 
private international law. 
20 As an aside, the assistant registrar cited the above paragraph 
from Yeo’s lecture as an example of an argument against the 
consideration of the SICC in the Spiliada calculus.36 With respect, it is 
clear from the context of his lecture that Yeo was not making such an 
                                                          
35 Yeo Tiong Min SC, “Staying Relevant: Exercise of Jurisdiction in the Age of the 
SICC” Eighth Yong Pung How Professorship of Law Lecture (13 May 2015) 
at para 41. 
36 IM Skaugen SE v MAN Diesel & Turbo SE [2016] SGHCR 6 at [27]. 
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argument in that paragraph – what he was cautioning against was the 
idea that the High Court should apply the SICC’s private international 
law rules in cases involving a transfer to the SICC – the suggestion that 
the assistant registrar had put forth in his judgment. 
C. Related issue – Should the SICC be a factor in the “strong 
cause” test? 
21 Moving beyond the judgment in IM Skaugen, a related issue 
which arises for consideration is this: Where there is a choice of a 
foreign court, can the existence of the SICC also be a factor in the 
common law “strong cause” test37 to allow the Singapore High Court to 
hear the case notwithstanding the choice of a foreign court?38 In this 
context, the “strong cause” test applies where the parties’ dispute features 
a choice of court clause. Under this approach, the court will be strongly 
inclined towards enforcing the agreement39 and the party arguing for a 
breach must demonstrate strong reasons for the court to allow a breach 
of the agreement; that is, it is not reasonable or just that he should be 
held to the bargain.40 Where the chosen forum is a foreign court, the 
SICC may feature in the “strong cause” test by reducing the difficulty 
and inconvenience of arguing foreign law in Singapore where there are 
exceptional circumstances militating against the dispute proceeding in 
the chosen foreign court, potentially neutralising the advantages of 
pursuing proceedings abroad. For the same reasons, where the chosen 
court is Singapore, the unique procedural features of the SICC may 
make it more challenging to argue that proceedings should be stayed in 
favour of a foreign court.41 
                                                          
37 At the common law, where the parties have contractually chosen a court in which 
to bring their dispute, the party seeking to commence proceedings in a non-chosen 
court will only be able to do so if he can demonstrate “strong cause” amounting to 
exceptional circumstance for the court to hear the case. See Halsbury’s Laws of 
Singapore (LexisNexis, 2013) at para 75.121. 
38 The converse scenario where there is a choice of the Singapore courts will not be 
considered here, since it is unlikely that the existence of the Singapore 
International Commercial Court can be raised as an argument showing strong 
cause for the Singapore courts not to hear the case. 
39 The Hyundai Fortune [2004] 4 SLR(R) 548 at [8]. 
40 Amerco Timbers Pte Ltd v Chatsworth Timber Corp Pte Ltd [1977–1978] 
SLR(R) 112; The Asian Plutus [1990] 1 SLR(R) 504; The Hyundai Fortune [2004] 
4 SLR(R) 548 at [7]. 
41 It is already rather difficult for “strong cause” to be made out in such situations, 
since it is unlikely that the forum will take kindly to the argument that proceedings 
in the forum amount to a breach of natural justice. This situation also raises the 
question of whether the High Court can transfer the case to the Singapore 
International Commercial Court if there is an exclusive choice of the High Court. 
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22 Logically, if the SICC can be considered in the Spiliada analysis, 
it should also be allowed to feature in the “strong cause” test. However, 
in the case of a choice of foreign court clause, a fundamental issue is 
whether the SICC would be able to assume jurisdiction at all. On its 
face, O 110 r 12(4) of the Rules of Court does not prevent the High 
Court from transferring cases to the SICC under such circumstances, 
that is, where there is a choice of foreign court. The High Court can 
technically order a transfer on its own motion even if one party contests 
the transfer.42 However, such an order could be construed as an affront 
to the principle of party autonomy.43 As such, although it may be 
conceptually possible for the existence of the SICC to influence the 
“strong cause” test to allow the Singapore courts to hear the case 
notwithstanding a choice of foreign court, it is suggested that the 
Singapore courts should be slow to invoke this discretion. 
IV. Applicable test for exercise of the SICC’s jurisdiction 
23 The assistant registrar in IM Skaugen also discussed the 
applicable test for the exercise of the SICC’s jurisdiction. 
24 The exercise of the SICC’s jurisdiction is governed by O 110 of 
the Rules of Court. Order 110 r 7 states that the SICC has jurisdiction to 
hear a case if the case is of an international and commercial nature, the 
parties have submitted to the SICC under a written jurisdiction 
agreement, and the parties do not seek relief connected to a prerogative 
order. Order 110 r 8 states that the SICC may decline to assume 
jurisdiction if it is “not appropriate” for the SICC to hear the case. The 
reference to “appropriateness” is repeated in O 110 r 12(4) in the context 
of a transfer of proceedings from the High Court to the SICC. One of 
the requirements for a case to be transferred is that the High Court must 
consider that the case is “more appropriate” to be heard in the SICC. For 
ease of reference, the relevant provisions are reproduced here in full: 
Jurisdiction (O. 110, r. 7) 
7.—(1) The Court has the jurisdiction to hear and try an action if — 
(a) the claims between the plaintiffs and the defendants 
named in the originating process when it was first filed are of 
an international and commercial nature; 
(b) each plaintiff and defendant named in the 
originating process when it was first filed has submitted to 
                                                          
42 Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) O 110 r 12(4)(b)(ii). 
43 Man Yip, “The Resolution of Disputes before the Singapore International 
Commercial Court” (2016) 65(2) ICLQ 439 at 446. 
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the Court’s jurisdiction under a written jurisdiction 
agreement; and 
(c) the parties do not seek any relief in the form of, or 
connected with, a prerogative order (including a Mandatory 
Order, a Prohibiting Order, a Quashing Order or an Order 
for Review of Detention). 
Court may decline to assume jurisdiction (O. 110, r. 8) 
8.—(1) Subject to paragraph (2), the Court may decline to assume 
jurisdiction in an action under Rule 7(1) if it is not appropriate for the 
action to be heard in the Court. 
(2) The Court must not decline to assume jurisdiction in an 
action solely on the ground that the dispute between the parties is 
connected to a jurisdiction other than Singapore, if there is a written 
jurisdiction agreement between the parties. 
(3) In exercising its discretion under paragraph (1), the Court 
shall have regard to its international and commercial character. 
Transfer of proceedings to or from Court (O. 110, r. 12) 
12.—(4) A case may be transferred from the High Court to the Court 
only if the following requirements are met: 
(a) the High Court considers that — 
(i) the requirements in Rule 7(1)(a) and (c) 
are met; and 
(ii) [Deleted by S 756/2015 wef 01/01/2016] 
(iii) it is more appropriate for the case to be 
heard in the Court; 
(b) either — 
(i) a party has, with the consent of all other 
parties, applied for the transfer in accordance with 
Rule 13; or 
(ii) the High Court, after hearing the parties, 
orders the transfer on its own motion. 
25 The assistant registrar had the occasion to interpret these 
provisions. In his judgment, he held that O 110 r 12(4) was a test for 
the internal allocation of jurisdiction. Therefore, the reference to 
appropriateness in this context did not import the Spiliada test.44 
Instead, he held that the reference to appropriateness should be read 
together with the requirement in O 110 r 7 for a case to be international 
and commercial in nature before the SICC would assume jurisdiction, 
                                                          
44 IM Skaugen SE v MAN Diesel & Turbo SE [2016] SGHCR 6 at [111]. 
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and should be interpreted to filter out cases which appear international 
and commercial on the surface but are not so in substance. As such, the 
assistant registrar held that a case would be deemed to be “more 
appropriate” for transfer to the SICC for the purposes of O 110 r 12(4) if 
the case is “in substance both international and commercial in nature”.45 
26 Near the end of his judgment, the assistant registrar also 
discussed the proper interpretation of O 110 r 8. He noted that O 110 
r 8, in contrast to O 110 r 12(4), was a test for international jurisdiction. 
As for the substance of the test, he opined that the wording of O 110 r 8 
suggested that the Australian “clearly inappropriate forum” test set out in 
Voth should apply as the SICC’s test for international jurisdiction 
instead of the Spiliada test.46 At present, even though the High Court’s 
remarks in this regard were merely obiter dicta, the decision in 
IM Skaugen remains the only decision from the Singapore High Court 
on the principles governing the SICC’s exercise of jurisdiction and thus 
serves as a useful starting point for a discussion of the applicable 
principles nonetheless. 
A. Should common law tests be adopted for exercise of the SICC’s 
jurisdiction? 
27 With respect, it is suggested that neither the Voth nor the 
Spiliada test should apply in the context of O 110 r 8 of the Rules of 
Court. 
28 First, both the Voth and Spiliada tests are heavily reliant on 
foreign connections. As pointed out by Yeo in his Eighth Yong Pung 
How Professorship of Law Lecture:47 
The difference between the two tests is whether one is looking to see 
whether the foreign connections indicate that there is a clearly more 
appropriate forum elsewhere, or they make the forum a clearly 
inappropriate one. 
Given that O 110 r 8(2) expressly disavows sole reliance on foreign 
connections in deciding not to exercise jurisdiction, tests which by their 
nature incorporate a heavy reliance on foreign connections may not 
comport with the legislative intent for this rule. Although O 110 r 8(2) 
does allow foreign connections to be taken into account as long as they 
are not the sole consideration, the fact remains that the framework of 
                                                          
45 IM Skaugen SE v MAN Diesel & Turbo SE [2016] SGHCR 6 at [113]. 
46 IM Skaugen SE v MAN Diesel & Turbo SE [2016] SGHCR 6 at [145]. 
47 Yeo Tiong Min SC, “Staying Relevant: Exercise of Jurisdiction in the Age of the 
SICC” Eighth Yong Pung How Professorship of Law Lecture (13 May 2015) 
at para 32. 
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the rule suggests that foreign connections should not be a primary 
consideration in the SICC’s decision as to whether to exercise 
jurisdiction, thus pointing away from the wholesale incorporation of the 
common law approaches. 
29 Second, applying the common law approaches wholesale may 
also not comport with the broader policy intent behind the 
establishment of the SICC. As described earlier in this note, among 
other objectives, the creation of the SICC is intended to draw as many 
complex international commercial cases to Singapore as possible so as to 
enhance the development of Singapore law and promote growth in 
Singapore’s legal services sector. In addition, the SICC’s jurisdictional 
regime draws inspiration from the arbitral model.48 These factors 
suggest that the SICC should be allowed to decline jurisdiction only on 
very narrow grounds.49 The Spiliada approach is unlikely to be adequate 
for this purpose as it involves a holistic study of which forum is the most 
appropriate for the case to be heard in the interests of all parties and the 
ends of justice.50 The Voth approach, even though it ostensibly sets a 
higher threshold for the forum to decline to hear a case, invokes similar 
considerations to the Spiliada test and is unlikely to differ much from 
the Spiliada test in terms of practical effect. As Mason CJ and Deane, 
Dawson, and Gaudron JJ opined in their joint judgment in Voth itself:51 
The ‘clearly inappropriate forum’ test is similar to and, for that reason, 
is likely to yield the same result as the ‘more appropriate forum’ test in 
the majority of cases. The difference between the two tests will be of 
critical significance only in those cases – probably rare – in which it is 
held that an available foreign tribunal is the natural or more 
appropriate forum but in which it cannot be said that the local 
tribunal is a clearly inappropriate one. 
The Singapore Court of Appeal has expressed its agreement with this 
assessment of Voth.52 As such, it appears that neither the Voth nor the 
Spiliada approach provide the necessary stringency to facilitate the 
SICC’s achievement of its policy objectives. This is not a surprising 
conclusion since the Voth and Spiliada tests were intended for usage by 
courts exercising general civil jurisdiction and thus had to be flexible 
enough to account for a variety of situations, achieve natural justice and 
                                                          
48 Report of the Singapore International Commercial Court Committee (29 November 
2013) at paras 21(b) and 34; Man Yip, “The Resolution of Disputes before the 
Singapore International Commercial Court” (2016) 65(2) ICLQ 439 at 458. 
49 Yeo Tiong Min SC, “Staying Relevant: Exercise of Jurisdiction in the Age of the 
SICC” Eighth Yong Pung How Professorship of Law Lecture (13 May 2015) 
at para 32. 
50 Spiliada Maritime Corp v Cansulex Ltd [1987] 1 AC 460 at 476C. 
51 Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Proprietary Ltd (1990) 171 CLR 538 at 558. 
52 JIO Minerals FZC v Mineral Enterprises [2011] 1 SLR 391 at [47]. 
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conform with international comity.53 On the other hand, the SICC is a 
specialist court which has jurisdiction only in clearly defined situations. 
In view of the differing contextual backdrop of the SICC, its 
jurisdictional rules can be justifiably different from those of the High 
Court, for instance, by giving greater effect to party autonomy and the 
SICC’s underlying policy imperatives. 
30 Third, assuming that the Voth or Spiliada tests should be 
applied in the same context in which they are applied in the common 
law, there are few situations in which these tests would be applicable for 
the exercise of the SICC’s jurisdiction anyway. For the SICC to exercise 
jurisdiction over an action, there must be a written agreement stating 
the parties’ choice of the Singapore courts54 or the SICC specifically.55 
The SICC can also exercise jurisdiction over an action if the case is 
transferred from the High Court, even if there is no choice of the 
SICC.56 If there is a written agreement, then, assuming the SICC applies 
the parallel common law approach, the “strong cause” test should apply; 
that is, the court will hear the case unless the party arguing for a breach 
is able to show that it is not reasonable or just that he should be held to 
the bargain.57 If the SICC exercises jurisdiction pursuant to a transfer 
from the High Court, the SICC will not reconsider whether it has or will 
exercise jurisdiction.58 Therefore, with the foregoing in mind, there is 
only one conceivable situation in the context of O 110 r 8 where the 
Spiliada or Voth tests could be applied in a manner parallel with their 
usage in common law. This would be where the written jurisdiction 
agreement is a non-exclusive jurisdiction agreement. However, since 
jurisdiction agreements in favour of the SICC are deemed to be 
exclusive unless expressly provided for otherwise,59 these scenarios are 
unlikely to be a frequent occurrence. Therefore, if one were to interpret 
                                                          
53 Yeo Tiong Min SC, “Staying Relevant: Exercise of Jurisdiction in the Age of the 
SICC” Eighth Yong Pung How Professorship of Law Lecture (13 May 2015) 
at paras 50–51. 
54 In view of s 2(2) of the Choice of Court Agreements Act 2016 (Act 14 of 2016), 
which states that a choice of the Singapore courts is to be construed as including a 
choice of the Singapore International Commercial Court as well unless a contrary 
intention is shown. 
55 Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) O 110 r 7. 
56 Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) O 110 r 7(2)(a). 
57 The Asian Plutus [1990] 1 SLR(R) 504; The Hyundai Fortune [2004] 4 SLR(R) 548 
at [7]. 
58 Rules of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2014 Rev Ed) O 110 r 12(5)(a). It may be argued that 
O 110 r 12(5)(a) forbids the Singapore International Commercial Court (“SICC”) 
from reconsidering the existence of jurisdiction, but leaves the SICC free to 
consider whether it should exercise its jurisdiction. However, such an 
interpretation would frustrate the legislative purpose of this rule, which is 
ostensibly to prevent a repetition of the battle over jurisdiction in the SICC once it 
has been concluded in the High Court. 
59 Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) s 18F. 
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the “not appropriate” test in O 110 r 8 as incorporating either the Voth 
or Spiliada tests, these tests would in most situations have to be applied 
in contexts where they would not be applied in the common law. 
31 Should the applicable test be the common law “strong cause” 
test, then? The Report of the SICC Committee60 suggests that the 
applicable test where there is a choice of the SICC and a stay is sought 
should be the “strong cause” test.61 The argument for the “strong cause” 
test to be the applicable test is stronger than the arguments for the 
Spiliada or Voth tests in view of the test’s strong inclination towards the 
SICC assuming jurisdiction. The “strong cause” test would thus cohere 
better with the overall policy undergirding the establishment of the 
SICC and give strong effect to the principle of party autonomy. 
However, the “strong cause” test takes into account factors largely 
similar to those considered in the Spiliada and Voth tests,62 thus placing 
a heavy reliance on foreign connections as well. Therefore, to the extent 
that the Spiliada and Voth tests do not fit well with the tenor of O 110 r 8 
for this reason, the same arguments apply to the “strong cause” test. 
Although the “strong cause” test may potentially be modified to suit the 
SICC’s purposes, for example, by minimising reliance on foreign 
connections and emphasising the impact of the jurisdiction agreement,63 
it may be preferable for legal clarity to recognise that the SICC requires a 
distinct approach to the exercise of jurisdiction due to its unique 
purposes and rules, rather than attempting to shoehorn the SICC’s 
approach into existing categories. 
B. What should be the applicable approach for exercise of  
the SICC’s jurisdiction? 
32 What should be the applicable approach for the exercise of the 
SICC’s jurisdiction, then? It is expected that the exact grounds for the 
SICC to decline to exercise jurisdiction under O 110 r 8 will become 
clearer as cases come to the SICC for decision, but some preliminary 
observations will be offered here. As a starting point, the grounds for the 
SICC to decline jurisdiction should be construed narrowly in order to 
                                                          
60 Report of the Singapore International Commercial Court Committee (29 November 
2013). 
61 Report of the Singapore International Commercial Court Committee (29 November 
2013) at para 26. 
62 Halsbury’s Laws of Singapore (LexisNexis, 2013) at para 75.121. 
63 It has been argued that the common law test may still be applicable for the 
Singapore International Commercial Court’s (“SICC”) exercise of jurisdiction 
under O 110 r 8 if one reads O 110 r 8(2) as merely placing so much weight on the 
choice of SICC agreement that foreign connections become irrelevant in the 
SICC’s calculus: see Man Yip, “The Resolution of Disputes before the Singapore 
International Commercial Court” (2016) 65(2) ICLQ 439 at 457. 
© 2016 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders.
  
(2016) 28 SAcLJ IM Skaugen SE v MAN Diesel & Turbo SE 665 
 
give effect to the SICC’s policy objectives. One of the SICC’s principal 
considerations in this regard should be whether the case is indeed 
international and commercial in nature, as provided in O 110 r 8(3). 
33 The question is whether the courts, in determining 
“appropriateness” pursuant to O 110 r 8, should solely have regard to 
whether the case is both international and commercial in nature. It has 
been argued that it can be reasonably assumed that this is not the sole 
consideration under O 110 r 8 since it would be “unduly convoluted” for 
the requirement of “international and commercial nature” to be written 
in a separate paragraph from the test of “appropriateness” if the 
intention was indeed for the test to comprise solely of this 
requirement.64 It is suggested that notwithstanding the broader policy 
objective of having very narrow grounds for the SICC to decline 
jurisdiction, it would be advantageous for the SICC to retain the 
discretion to stay proceedings in exceptional circumstances. Examples 
of exceptional circumstances that could justify the SICC declining to 
exercise jurisdiction are cases where there is a high risk of conflicting 
judgments from different jurisdictions,65 or where the proceedings will 
turn on questions of the validity of foreign administrative action. 
Notably, having the discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction on 
exceptional grounds is not inconsistent with the SICC’s policy 
imperative of declining jurisdiction only on very narrow grounds; 
rather, it is an acknowledgement of the competing duties that the SICC 
has to balance, as both a national court and a responsible player in the 
global judicial landscape.66 
34 As for the approach the High Court should take in determining 
whether to transfer proceedings to the SICC under O 110 r 12(4), in 
addition to the requirement that the case be “in substance both 
international and commercial in nature”, it is suggested that the High 
Court should also consider whether a transfer of proceedings to the 
SICC will bring significant benefits to the judicial process and the 
litigants involved to justify the inconvenience and delay involved in 
effecting such a transfer. For example, it has been argued that the High 
Court should not transfer a case to the SICC where the proceedings 
                                                          
64 Man Yip, “The Resolution of Disputes before the Singapore International 
Commercial Court” (2016) 65(2) ICLQ 439 at 458. 
65 See Man Yip, “The Resolution of Disputes before the Singapore International 
Commercial Court” (2016) 65(2) ICLQ 439 at 458 for an argument that the 
Singapore International Commercial Court should decline to exercise jurisdiction 
in such a situation. 
66 Denise H Wong, “The Rise of the International Commercial Court: What Is It and 
Will It Work?” (2014) 33 CJQ 205 at 223–224. 
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have already reached a relatively advanced stage as this would cause 
“substantial delay to the resolution of the dispute”.67 
V. Conclusion 
35 At present, the law in Singapore relating to the rules governing 
the SICC’s jurisdiction is in a nascent stage of development. The 
judgment in IM Skaugen is a valuable and able effort to highlight and 
discuss some of the existing areas of ambiguity in the law. This note 
agrees with the assistant registrar’s conclusion that the possibility of a 
transfer to the SICC should influence the High Court’s application of the 
Spiliada approach as it decides whether to exercise international 
jurisdiction over an action. However, a strict conceptual separation 
between international jurisdiction and internal allocation of jurisdiction 
should be maintained. In addition, in contrast to the assistant registrar’s 
suggestion, this note has argued that the SICC’s test for the exercise of its 
international jurisdiction pursuant to O 110 r 8 should not be any of the 
common law approaches. Instead, the SICC should apply a unique test 
that inclines towards the exercise of jurisdiction but allows it to have the 
flexible discretion to decline to exercise jurisdiction in exceptional 
circumstances. As for the applicable approach under O 110 r 12(4), in 
addition to the requirement that a case be “in substance international 
and commercial in nature”, the High Court should weigh the benefits of 
a transfer against the potential inconvenience and hassle that litigants 
may have to go through if a transfer is ordered. As future cases 
concerning the SICC’s jurisdiction arrive for decision in the Singapore 
courts, it is hoped that the arguments presented in this note will be of 
value to the courts and legal practitioners alike. 
 
                                                          
67 See Man Yip, “The Resolution of Disputes before the Singapore International 
Commercial Court” (2016) 65(2) ICLQ 439 at 462. However, as the Singapore 
International Commercial Court becomes increasingly entrenched as a leading 
forum for international commercial litigation, such situations may become less 
frequent as transfers would likely be effected earlier in the High Court proceedings. 
© 2016 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders.
